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This paper argues that there are powerful similarities between cognitive devel- 
opment in children and scientific theory change. These similarities are best ex- 
plained by postulating an underlying abstract set of rules and representations that 
underwrite both types of cognitive abilities. In fact, science may be successful 
largely because it exploits powerful and flexible cognitive devices that were de- 
signed by evolution to facilitate learning in young children. Both science and 
cognitive development involve abstract, coherent systems of entities and rules, 
theories. In both cases, theories provide predictions, explanations, and interpre- 
tations. In both, theories change in characteristic ways in response to counterev- 
idence. These ideas are illustrated by an account of children's developing under- 
standing of the mind. 
1. Introduction. Often, progress in science begins with finding the right 
analogy. Recently, cognitive and developmental psychologists have in- 
voked the analogy of science itself. They talk about our everyday concep- 
tions of the world as implicit or intuitive theories, and about changes in 
those conceptions as theory changes (Carey 1985, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith 
1974, 1988; Gopnik and Wellman 1992, 1994; Gopnik 1984, 1988; Keil 
1989; Perner 1991; Wellman 1990; Wellman and Gelman 1992). But to 
make further progress we need to go beyond analogies: light waves are 
not wet, planets cannot be made into pies and apples can. We need to 
specify more substantively and precisely what the real similarities and dif- 
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ferences between children and scientists are, and to show why the similar- 
ities matter and the differences do not. We only really make progress when 
we can specify the common structure that unites light and water, or apples 
and planets, or children and scientists. 
In this article, I will try to give a more substantive and precise charac- 
terization of what it means to say that cognitive development is like sci- 
entific change. I will describe and defend what some have called "the the- 
ory theory." Moreover, I want to argue that the analogy cuts both ways: 
specifying the parallels between cognitive development and science not 
only can help us to understand cognitive development, it also can help us 
to understand science itself. The moral of my story is not that children are 
little scientists but that scientists are big children. Scientists and children 
both employ the same particularly powerful and flexible set of cognitive 
devices. These devices enable scientists and children to develop genuinely 
new knowledge of the world around them. I will first defend this idea in 
general terms, then give a more substantive account of what these cogni- 
tive devices might be like, and finally give some concrete examples from 
research on cognitive development. 
Many outside the field of developmental psychology (and some inside 
it) have objected to the scientific analogy on prima facie grounds. In fact, 
the claim that children construct theories is often greeted by scientists, 
philosophers and psychologists, particularly those with limited experience 
of anyone younger than a freshman, with shocked incredulity. Surely, they 
cry, you cannot really mean that mere children construct theories, not real 
theories, the kind of theories that we, that is we serious grown- up scien- 
tists, philosophers and psychologists construct with so much sweat and 
tears. Aside from injured amour propre, these foes of the theory theory 
point to a number of differences between children and scientists. Scientists 
are supposed to be consciously-in fact, self-consciously-reflective about 
their theory-forming and confirming activities. They talk about them and 
they are part of the scientific stream of consciousness. Only a few adult 
humans become scientists, there is a division of labor. They do science in 
a structured institutional setting, in which there is much formal interaction 
with other scientists. Scientific theory change takes place within the sci- 
entific community and a single change may take many years to be com- 
pleted. 
Obviously, none of these things is true of children. Infants and young 
children do not talk about the fact that they are formulating or evaluating 
theories, and they certainly do not publish journal articles, present con- 
ference papers, or attempt to torpedo the reputations of those who dis- 
agree with them. All children develop theories. Conceptual change in chil- 
dren takes place within a single individual and takes place relatively 
quickly, children may develop and replace many theories in the space of 
486 
THE SCIENTIST AS CHILD 
a few months or years. Children usually converge on the same theories at 
about the same age. Insofar as these particular types of phenomenology 
and sociology are an important part of theory formation and change in 
science, whatever the children are doing is not science. 
In order for the theory theory to be more than just a metaphor there 
has to be some interesting, substantive, cognitive characterization of sci- 
ence, independent of phenomenology and sociology. Is it plausible that 
science has this kind of cognitive foundation, and that it is similar to the 
cognitive processes we see in children? 
We might imagine that we could turn to the philosophy of science for 
a simple answer to this question. But philosophers of science have really 
only begun to consider the question themselves. Historically, the study of 
science has been divided between normative and sociological approaches 
to science. One approach details the structure of an ideal scientific inquiry, 
often as if it involved an abstract set of logical principles. The other focuses 
on the historical and sociological details of actual scientific practice. Nei- 
ther the normative nor the sociological projects have had much to say 
directly about the cognitive foundations of science. The possibility of a 
cognitive science of science has only just begun to be considered (see e.g 
Giere 1991). 
2. A Cognitive View of Science. What might a cognitive view of science be 
like? Science is cognitive almost by definition, insofar as cognition is about 
how minds arrive at veridical conceptions of the world. In one sense sci- 
entists must be using some cognitive abilities to produce new scientific 
theories, and to recognize their truth when they are produced by others. 
Scientists have the same brains as other human beings, and they use those 
brains, however assisted by culture, to develop knowledge about the 
world. Ultimately, the sociology of science must consist of a set of indi- 
vidual decisions by individual humans to produce or accept theories. Sci- 
entists eventually converge on the same set of decisions. The view that is 
the consequence of these decisions converges on the truth about the world. 
Scientists must be using human cognitive capacities to do this. What else 
could they be using? 
The assumption of cognitive science is that human beings are endowed 
by evolution with a wide variety of devices that enable us to arrive at a 
roughly veridical view of the world. Usually in cognitive science we think 
of these devices in terms of representations and rules that operate on those 
representations. At any given time, people have some set of representa- 
tions and rules that operate on them. Over time, there are other cognitive 
processes that transform both representations and rules. These represen- 
tations and rules are often an interesting combination of the logical and 
the psychological: they are abstract structures, often described in terms of 
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an implicit computational model, but they are also intended to be psy- 
chologically real descriptions of how the mind works. The representations 
and rules may not have any special phenomenological mark, one way or 
the other, we may not know that we have them, though sometimes we do. 
They may be deeply influenced by information that comes from other 
people, but they are not merely conventional and they could function 
outside of any social community. 
We might think of science in terms of such a system of representations 
and rules. The question that we would ask, then, was whether there were 
any generalizations to be made about the kinds of representations and 
rules that underlie scientific knowledge, in particular, and the kinds of 
processes that transform those representations and rules over time. Is there 
anything distinctive or special about scientific representations and rules, 
something that differentiates them from other kinds of representations and 
rules? Moreover, does the epistemological potency of science, its ability 
to get things right, come from the nature of these representations and 
rules, or from some feature of reflective phenomenology or social insti- 
tutionalization? 
A further question, then, would be whether these representations and 
rules are similar or indeed identical to those we observe in children, and 
whether changes in those rules and representations over time are like the 
changes we see in cognitive development. This might be true even if the 
phenomenology and social organization of knowledge in children and sci- 
entists are quite different. And it might be particularly likely to be true if, 
in fact, the specific phenomenology and sociology of science are not a 
necessary condition for its epistemological force. 
These seem to be straightforward and important questions. It might, of 
course, turn out that there is, in fact, no distinctive or interesting char- 
acterization of the representations and rules that underlie scientific knowl- 
edge. Or it might turn out that there is little relationship between the 
representations and rules of scientists and those of children. Is it worth 
trying to find out if there is such a relationship? 
The detailed empirical work is what I will ultimately turn to, but the 
project is more plausible and promising than it might seem on the standard 
view. It is promising not only for our understanding of cognitive devel- 
opment but for our understanding of science itself. A cognitive view of 
science, and particularly a view that identifies cognitive change in science 
and childhood, might provide an explanation of the most important thing 
about science; namely that it gets things right. 
Recent work in the study of science presents a dilemma. Science is an 
activity that is performed by human beings in a social context, and that 
proceeds in various and haphazard ways. But it nevertheless manifests a 
kind of logic, and converges on a truthful account of the world. A cog- 
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nitive view of science might provide an important bridge between nor- 
mative or logical and sociological views of science. It might indeed be true 
that there were particular kinds of abstract, logical structures that char- 
acterized the important cognitive achievements of science. And it might 
also be true that looking at the practice of actual science, we might see 
rather little of that abstract logical structure. But this is quite similar to 
other cases of cognitive science, from perception to decision-making to 
parsing to problem-solving. Human beings quite typically acquire knowl- 
edge in a way that leads to the truth on average and in the long run, but 
can also produce errors and incoherencies, that is grounded in a social life 
but not socially arbitrary. Quite typically, an abstract structure underlies 
some human cognitive activity that is not at all apparent in superficial 
phenomenology or practice. Often, that structure is related in interesting 
ways to the structures we would invent if we constructed an ideal machine 
to perform that cognitive activity. (We might think of artificial intelligence 
as a normative enterprise). But that structure is rarely identical to the ideal 
machine's structure. 
A cognitive scientist would say that evolution constructed truth-finding 
cognitive processes. Science employs a particularly powerful and flexible 
set of these cognitive abilities. Science uses a set of representations and 
rules that are particularly well-suited to uncovering the truth about the 
world. Science gets it right because it uses psychological devices that were 
designed by evolution precisely to get things right. 
The idea that science is related to our ordinary cognition, and that both 
science and ordinary cognition work for evolutionary reasons is not, of 
course, new. It is the basic idea behind the "naturalistic epistemology" of 
Quine and others (Quine 1970; Goldman 1986; Kornblith 1985). I want 
to propose, however, a more specific version of the naturalistic episte- 
mology story. This view also might be a reason for supposing that the 
structures of science are particularly likely to be similar to those involved 
in cognitive development. On this view there might actually be a closer 
link between science and childhood cognition than between science and 
our usual adult cognitive endeavors. 
Let us go back for a minute to the basic idea that we are endowed by 
evolution with devices for constructing and manipulating rules and rep- 
resentations and that these devices give us a veridical view of the world. 
This raises an interesting evolutionary puzzle. Where did the particularly 
powerful and flexible cognitive devices of science come from? After all, we 
have only been doing science in an organized way for the last 500 years 
or so, presumably they did not evolve so that we could do that. I suggest 
that many of these cognitive devices are involved in the staggering amount 
of learning that goes on in infancy and childhood. Indeed, we might tell 
an evolutionary story that these devices evolved, in particular, to allow 
human children to learn. 
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Consider a well-established finding in evolutionary psychology. Several 
distinctive traits are found to correlate with large cortices (relative to body 
size) across a wide range of species. Moreover, they are also correlated 
within variants of closely related species. The traits include variation of 
diet, polygamy, small clutch size, a wide behavioral repertoire, and, most 
significantly for our case, the relative lack of precocious specialized cog- 
nitive abilities in the young, that is, a period of long immaturity (see e.g. 
Bennett and Harvey 1985). 
Passing quickly over polygamy, human beings are, of course, at the 
extreme end of the distribution on all these other traits and on relative 
cortical size. From an evolutionary point of view, three of the most dis- 
tinctive features of human beings are the plasticity of their behavior, their 
ability to adapt to an extremely wide variety of environments and their 
long, protected, immaturity. Equipping human children with particularly 
powerful and flexible cognitive devices, devices that are good at construct- 
ing accurate representations of new and unexpected worlds, might be an 
important part of this evolutionary strategy. We might indeed think of 
childhood as a period when many of the requirements for survival are 
suspended, so that children can concentrate on acquiring a veridical pic- 
ture of the particular physical and social world in which they find them- 
selves. Once they know where they are, as it were, they can figure out what 
to do. On this view, we might think of infancy as a sort of extended stay 
in a Center for Advanced Studies, with even better food delivery systems. 
It is an interesting empirical question as to how much of this episte- 
mological activity survives in ordinary adult life. Perhaps not much. Once 
the child has engaged in the theorizing necessary to specify the features of 
its world, most of us, most of the time, may simply go on to the central 
evolutionary business of feeding and reproducing. But these powerful the- 
ory formation abilities continue to allow all of us at some times, and some 
of us, namely professional scientists, much of the time, to continue to 
discover more and more stuff about the world around us. On this view, 
science is a kind of spandrel, an epiphenomenon of childhood. 
2.1 Objection 1: Phenomenology. So I am proposing that the core sim- 
ilarity that we capture in the scientific analogy is a similarity in the rules 
and representations that allow scientists and children to make cognitive 
progress. With this cognitive perspective in mind, we can turn back to the 
phenomenological and sociological differences between scientists and chil- 
dren. Do they undermine the idea that there are deep cognitive similarities 
between the two groups? 
To take the phenomenological question first, it is difficult to see, on the 
face of it, why conscious phenomenology of a particular kind would play 
an essential role in finding things out about the world. A characteristic 
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lesson of the cognitive revolution is that human beings (or, for that matter, 
machines) can perform extremely complex feats of representation without 
any phenomenology at all. It is rather characteristic of human cognition 
that it is largely inaccessible to conscious reflection. Why should this be 
different in the case of scientific knowledge? 
Moreover, the actual degree of conscious reflection in real science is 
very unclear. It is true that scientists articulate their beliefs about the world 
or about their fields of scientific endeavor. So, as we will see, do children. 
But scientists do not typically articulate the processes that generate those 
beliefs, or that lead them to accept them, nor are they very reliable when 
they do. The reflective processes are really the result of after-the-fact re- 
constructions by philosophers of science. 
Of course, scientists may sometimes do philosophy of science. They 
may, from time to time, be reflective about their own activities and try to 
work out the structure of the largely unconscious processes that actually 
lead them to form or accept theories. Moreover, there may be circum- 
stances in which this kind of deliberative self-reflection on their own theory 
formation practices is a real advantage to particular scientists with partic- 
ular types of problems. However, it seems, at least, much too strong to 
say that it is a necessary condition for theory formation and change in 
science. It seems unlikely that it is the reflective phenomenology itself that 
is what gives scientists their theory formation capacities or that gives those 
theories their epistemological force. 
2.2 Objection 2: Sociology. The sociological objections prompt similar 
replies. The socially oriented view of philosophy of science has always had 
a difficult time explaining how science gets it right at all. It has been dif- 
ficult to reconcile with scientific realism: just as it is hard to see how phe- 
nomenology, by itself, could lead to veridicality it is hard to see how a 
particular social structure, by itself, could do so. Moreover, children are 
less isolated than the term "little scientist" is likely to imply. They live in 
a rich social structure with much opportunity for contradiction, instruc- 
tion, and the linguistic transmission of information. We are not dealing 
with a contrast between a non-social process and a social one, but between 
two different types of social organization. 
Of course, just as reflective phenomenology might be helpful in solving 
certain types of problems, so might the characteristic sociological insti- 
tutions of science. The most striking sociological difference between chil- 
dren and scientists is the division of labor in science, and the resulting 
complex system of hierarchical social structure. But these features of sci- 
ence seem to have more to do with the kinds of problems children and 
scientists approach than with the processes they use to solve them. It is 
characteristic of the child's problems that the evidence necessary to solve 
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them is very easily and widely available, within crawling distance anyway. 
It is characteristic of scientific problems that the evidence necessary to 
solve them is rather difficult to obtain. Formal science quite characteris- 
tically applies cognitive processes to things that are too big or too small, 
too rare or too distant, for normal perception to provide rich evidence. 
Children, in contrast, typically make up theories about middle-sized, close, 
perceptible and familiar objects. 
It is this paucity of evidence that leads to the division of labor, and to 
many of the sociological institutions characteristic of science. All you need 
is a mother and some mixing bowls to find evidence of the spatial prop- 
erties of objects. To find evidence of Higg's boson you need, quite literally, 
an Act of Congress. When evidence-gathering becomes this fragmented, 
complex social relations become more important, and the whole process 
of finding the truth becomes drastically slower (see Kitcher 1993, for an 
account of how different social institutions could help scientists to con- 
verge on the truth in these circumstances). 
It is worth noting that science has become more specialized and insti- 
tutionalized as the problems of science have become more evidentially 
intractable. The institutional arrangements of Kepler or Newton or even 
Darwin were very different from those of contemporary scientists. How- 
ever, it seems difficult to argue that the basic theory formation capacities 
of current scientists are strikingly superior to those of Kepler or Newton, 
in spite of the large differences in social organization. 
It is easy to see how the division of labor could result from the need for 
various kinds of evidence, and how that structure could lead to particular 
distinctive problems and patterns of timing in scientific change. The social 
hierarchy and the division of labor, like self-reflection, may be genuinely 
helpful in solving certain problems. What is extremely hard to see, how- 
ever, is how the hierarchy could lead to the truth in general, or how the 
division of labor could itself lead to theory formation or confirmation. 
The division of labor is one consequence of the different problems children 
and scientists tackle, and it may be that it gives scientists an advantage in 
solving those particular problems, just as self-reflection may give scientists 
an advantage in solving particular problems. However, neither of these 
facts implies that the basic cognitive resources children and scientists use 
to tackle those problems are different. 
Moreover, in other respects the child's sociological organization may 
actually be superior to the scientist's for cognitive purposes. Infants and 
children have infinite leisure, there are no other demands on their time 
and energy, they are free to explore the cognitive problems that are rele- 
vant to them almost all the time. They also have a community of adults 
who, one way or another, are designed to further the children's cognitive 
progress (if only to keep them quiet and occupied). Finally, this commu- 
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nity already holds many of the tenets of the theory the child will converge 
upon and has an interest in passing on information relevant to the theory 
to the child. 
In fact, we might argue that much of the social structure of science is 
an attempt to replicate the privileged sociological conditions of infancy. 
Aside from the division of labor, the social hierarchy largely determines 
who will get the leisure and equipment to do cognitive work, and to whom 
other scientists should listen. The infant solves these problems without 
needing elaborate social arrangements. These are all differences between 
children and scientists, but again they do not imply differences in the 
fundamental cognitive processes that the two groups employ. 
We might, on my view, think of formal science as a sort of cognitive 
horticulture. Horticulturalists take basic natural processes of species 
change, mutation, inheritance and so on, and put them to work to serve 
very particular cultural and social ends in a very particular cultural and 
social setting. In the 16th century they bred roses to look like 16th century 
women, and in the mid-twentieth century they bred roses to look like mid- 
twentieth century cars. In one sense, an explanation of the genesis of these 
flowers will involve extraordinarily complex and contingent cultural facts. 
But in another sense, the basic facts of mutation, inheritance and selection 
are the same in all these cases, and at a deeper level it is these facts that 
explain why the flowers have the traits that they do. 
In the same way, we can think of organized science as taking natural 
mechanisms of conceptual change, designed by evolution to facilitate 
learning in childhood, and putting them to use in a culturally organized 
way. To explain scientific theory change we may need to talk about culture 
and society, but we will miss something important if we fail to see the link 
to natural learning mechanisms. 
There is an additional point to this metaphor. Clearly horticulture was, 
for a long time, the most vivid and immediate example of species change 
around. And yet, precisely because it was so deeply embedded in cultural 
and social practices it seemed irrelevant to the scientific project of explain- 
ing the origin of species naturalistically. It was only when Darwin, and 
then Mendel, pointed out the underlying similarities between "artificial" 
and natural species change that these common natural mechanisms be- 
came apparent. Similarly, science has been the most vivid and immediate 
example of conceptual change around (particularly since most philoso- 
phers hang out with scientists more than with children). Its cultural and 
social features have distracted us from looking at in naturalistic terms. 
Looking at the similarities between conceptual change in children and in 
science may yield evidence of a common natural mechanism. 
2.3 Objection 3. Timing and Convergence. Another difference we might 
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point to between children and scientists is that children converge on 
roughly similar theories at roughly similar times. It might be objected that 
scientists do not always show this sort of uniform development, and that 
this weighs against the theory formation view. The theory theory proposes 
that there are powerful cognitive processes that revise existing theories in 
response to evidence. If cognitive agents began with the same initial the- 
ory, tried to solve the same problems, and were presented with similar 
patterns of evidence over the same period of time they should, precisely, 
converge on the same theories at about the same time. These assumptions 
are very likely to be true for children developing ordinary everyday knowl- 
edge. Children will certainly start with the same initial theory and the same 
theory formation capacities. Moreover, the evidence is ubiquitous and is 
likely to be very similar for all children. 
Notice, however, that, for scientists, these basic assumptions are not 
usually going to be true. In science, the relevant evidence, far from being 
ubiquitous, is rare and difficult to come by, and often must be taken on 
trust from others. The social mechanisms of deference, authority and trust, 
are, like all social mechanisms, highly variable. Moreover, different sci- 
entists also often begin with different theories, and quite typically ap- 
proach different problems. 
In fact, when the assumption of common initial theories and common 
patterns of evidence, presented in the same sequence, does hold, scientists, 
like children, do converge on a common account of the world. Indeed, 
even the timing of scientific discoveries is often strikingly similar, given 
independent labs working on the same problem with a similar initial the- 
ory and similar access to evidence (hence all those shared Nobel Prizes). 
This convergence to the truth itself is the best reason for thinking that 
some general cognitive structures are at work in scientific theory change. 
Scientists working independently converge on similar accounts at similar 
times, not because evolutionary theory or the calculus or the structure of 
DNA (to take some famous examples) are innate, but because similar 
minds approaching similar problems are presented with similar patterns 
of evidence. The theory theory proposes that the cognitive processes that 
lead to this convergence in science are also operating in children. 
3. What is a Theory? So far I have been trying to argue, in a general way, 
that scientists and children might employ similar cognitive structures, simi- 
lar types of rules and representations. Can we characterize these cognitive 
structures in more detail? What type of rules and representations might 
be involved in theories and theory change, in both scientists and children? 
Here is where the metaphor gets to be most useful and interesting for 
developmental psychologists. Our strategy, at least initially, has largely 
been simply to adopt the detailed descriptions of theories and theory 
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change in the philosophy of science, translate them into cognitive psycho- 
logical terms, and see how well they fit the psychological data. 
This approach is quite congruent with some work in the psychology and 
cognitive science of science. However, it also is differs from the strategies 
often employed by psychologists of science. Traditionally, psychological 
studies of science focused on the aspects of science that made it different 
from ordinary cognition, so that issues of "creativity" or "insight" were 
at the fore. Conversely, some more recent naturalistic approaches to sci- 
ence have tried to show that scientific knowledge can be reduced to the 
much broader kinds of knowledge typically discussed in psychology. The- 
ories just are analogies, metaphors, cognitive models, production systems, 
connectionist nets, scripts, etc. (see, for example, some essays in Giere 
1991). The developmental strategy is unlike either of these. Developmental 
psychologists have found that the typical tools of cognitive science are 
inadequate for explaining the psychological phenomena we are concerned 
with. In particular, cognitive science has been notoriously bad at explain- 
ing qualitative conceptual change. We want to turn to the example of 
science for clues to more specific and powerful types of cognitive struc- 
tures. Theories seem to fit the bill. 
One difficulty with this strategy, of course, is that there is much contro- 
versy within the philosophy of science about what theories are and how 
to characterize them. There are the general debates between normative 
and sociological views. Moreover, within the normative tradition there are 
extensive debates about the appropriate characterization of the logic of 
science, most notably a debate between sentential or syntactic and seman- 
tic or model theories (van Fraassen, 1980). And there are, of course, de- 
bates about the metaphysical status of scientific theories, particularly in 
domains like quantum physics. 
There are interesting possible interactions between these debates and 
the project of finding a cognitive science of science. Some authors have 
argued that a model-theoretic view of theories is more compatible with 
cognitive science than a sentential view. On the other hand a prominent 
foundational view of cognitive science suggests that all cognitive represen- 
tations are best understood syntactically (Fodor 1975). Similarly, the nat- 
uralistic view seems to presuppose some form of scientific realism, but 
precisely what form is unclear. 
It seems possible, however, to develop a cognitive account of theories 
that does not necessarily take sides in these debates, and that may be 
compatible with many different philosophical accounts. We have taken 
the modest route of focusing on those features of theories that are most 
generally accepted across many different conceptions of science. Whatever 
the broader theoretical arguments may be, both normative and sociologi- 
cal investigations of science provide us with rich and suggestive data about 
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the nature of characteristic scientific representations and rules. So what 
follows will be brief and, I hope, largely uncontroversial, not to say bland. 
(For a more extensive version see Gopnik and Wellman 1994; Gopnik and 
Meltzoff 1997). Even philosophers of science, however, may find that some 
interesting consequences follow when we consider the truisms of philos- 
ophy of science in psychological terms. 
Note also that the developmental project is not the typical philosophical 
project of finding necessary and sufficient conditions by generating coun- 
terexamples. Some of what I will say about theories, in general, undoubt- 
edly does not apply to particular instances of scientific theories. As a psy- 
chologist I am looking for a natural kind, not a logical one, and I want 
to use the descriptions of historians and philosophers of science as a start- 
ing place for discovering that natural kind. 
3.1 Structural Features of Theories. Theories are systems of abstract 
entities and laws that are related to one another in coherent ways. When 
we say that theories are abstract, we mean that theoretical constructs are 
typically phrased in a vocabulary that is different from the vocabulary of 
the evidence that supports the theory. Theoretical constructs appeal to a 
set of entities removed from, and underlying, the evidential phenomena 
they explain. 
Theoretical constructs work together in systems with a particular struc- 
ture. The entities postulated by a theory are closely, "lawfully," interre- 
lated with one another and with the evidence. 
Theories also typically appeal to some underlying causal structure that 
we think is responsible for the superficial regularities in the data. Causal 
relationships are central to theories in two ways. The intratheoretic rela- 
tions, the laws, are typically interpreted in causal ways. The mass of an 
object causes other objects to move towards it, adaptation causes certain 
mutations to be preserved. But an equally important aspect of theories is 
that the theoretical entities are seen to be causally responsible for the 
evidence. The elliptical movements of the planets cause the planets to ap- 
pear to march across the sky in distinctive ways. 
Finally, theories make ontological commitments and support counter- 
factuals. An accepted theory is supposed to cut nature at its joints, the 
theoretical entities and laws are supposed to tell you what there is and 
what it must do. One psychological test of theoreticity is the nature of our 
surprise at violations of the theory. If we are committed to the theory such 
violations should strike us, not only as surprising, but as being impossible 
and unbelievable in an important and strong way. This differentiates the- 
ories from other types of knowledge. 
3.2 Functional Features of Theories. These structural features of theories 
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have a number of functional advantages. They allow us to make predic- 
tions about new evidence, they help us to interpret evidence and they 
enable us to explain evidence. A theory, in contrast to a mere empirical 
generalization, makes predictions about a wide variety of evidence, in- 
cluding evidence that played no role in the theory's initial construction. 
Some of these predictions will be correct, theories will accurately predict 
future events described at the evidential level. Others will be incorrect. The 
ability to produce wide-ranging predictions is perhaps the most obvious 
pragmatic benefit of science, and it may also be the most important evo- 
lutionary benefit of developing theory formation abilities. In fact, making 
accurate predictions about the behavior of the world and your fellow or- 
ganisms is the sine qua non of cognition. 
An additional characteristic of theories is that they produce interpre- 
tations of evidence, not simply descriptions and typologies of evidence, 
and generalizations about it. Indeed, theories strongly influence which 
pieces of evidence we consider salient or important. From a psychological 
point of view, theories provide a way of deciding which evidence is relevant 
to a particular problem, they are a way of solving what computer scientists 
call "the frame problem". This might also be an evolutionary benefit of 
theory formation. 
A third function of theories that is often mentioned is that they provide 
explanations. The coherence and abstractness of theories, and their causal 
attributions and ontological commitments, together give them an explan- 
atory force that mere typologies of the data, or generalizations about it, 
lack. 
In fact, it may be that what we mean by saying that we have explained 
something is simply that we can give an abstract, coherent, causal account 
of it. Indeed, it is difficult to find a characterization of "explanation" other 
than this. From a philosophical point of view, this may be fine. Indeed, 
often philosophical enterprises consist of giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the application of some term. But from a cognitive point 
of view, there is a puzzling circularity about most philosophical attempts 
to explain explanation. The cognitive functions of prediction and inter- 
pretation seem obvious enough, representations and rules that allowed for 
predictions and interpretations would plainly enable an organism to func- 
tion better in the world. The functional significance of explanation is less 
clear. 
A psychological perspective may help to supply a resolution to this 
puzzle. Why does it seem to us that explaining is a function of theorizing, 
but not that theorizing is a function of explaining? The commonsense 
notion of explanation, at least, seems to involve a kind of affect, a sense 
of how satisfying a good theory can be. From an evolutionary point, of 
view we might suggest that explanation is to cognition as orgasm (or at 
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least male orgasm) is to reproduction. It identifies the motivational and 
affective state that serves as a marker for the fulfillment of the underlying 
evolutionary function. An important point of the empirical developmental 
work, and a common observation about science, is that the search for 
better theories has a kind of internally-driven motivation, quite separate 
from the more superficial motivations provided by the sociology. From 
our point of view, we make theories in search of explanation or make love 
in search of orgasm. From an evolutionary point of view, however, the 
relation may be quite the reverse, we search for explanations and orgasms 
because such a search leads us to make theories and love. We might spec- 
ulate that we were designed with a theory formation drive and that expla- 
nation is a symptom of that drive in action. 
3.3 Dynamic Features of Theories. So far we have been talking about 
the static features of theories, the features that might distinguish them 
from other cognitive structures such as typologies, schemes, scripts, met- 
aphors, etc. But the dynamic features of theories, the processes involved 
in theory formation and change, are equally characteristic and perhaps 
even more important from a developmental point of view. There are char- 
acteristic intermediate processes involved in the transition from one theory 
to another. 
The most significant factor in theory change is the accumulation of 
counterevidence to the theory. However, the initial reaction, as it were, of 
a theory to counterevidence may be a kind of denial. The interpretive 
mechanisms of the theory may treat the counterevidence as noise, mess, 
not worth attending to. At a slightly later stage, the theory may develop 
ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses designed to account specifically for such coun- 
terevidence. Auxiliary hypotheses may also be helpful because they phrase 
the counterevidence in the accepted vocabulary of the earlier theory. Such 
auxiliary hypotheses, however, often appear, over time, to undermine the 
coherence that is one of a theory's strengths. 
A next step requires the availability or formulation of some alternative 
model to the original theory. A theory may limp along for some time under 
the weight of its auxiliary hypotheses if no alternative way of making 
progress is available. Often the original idea for the new theory is an 
extension or application of an idea that is already implicit in some pe- 
ripheral part of the earlier theory. For example, Darwin takes the idea of 
selection, which was already widely understood and used in the context 
of animal breeding and horticulture, and applies it to a new problem. This 
process may seem like analogy or metaphor, but it involves more serious 
conceptual changes. It is not simply that the new idea is the old idea 
applied to a new domain, but that the earlier idea is itself modified to fit 
its role in the new theory. Moreover, the fertility of the alternative idea 
498 
THE SCIENTIST AS CHILD 
itself may not be recognized immediately. Initially it may only be applied 
to the problematic cases. We may see only later on that the new idea also 
provides an explanation for the evidence that was explained by the earlier 
theory. 
A final important dynamic feature of theory formation is the existence 
of a period of intense experimentation and/or observation. This period 
might span both the crisis of the earlier theory, the period when anomalous 
results are being produced right and left, and the first stages of the new 
theory when a whole range of new predictions become available. The role 
that experimentation and observation play in theory change is still mys- 
terious, but that it plays some role seems plain. Obviously, experimenta- 
tion allows the scientist to test the predictions of the theory. But it is worth 
pointing out that, even in science, much experimentation is much less fo- 
cused than this, it is more like what we disparagingly call a fishing expe- 
dition. In addition to testing predictions, some experimentation enables 
the scientists to develop a stock of atheoretical empirical generalizations, 
which in turn will be subsumed and explained by the later theory. 
Perhaps the most important dynamic feature of theory change, however, 
underlying these particulars, is that theory change is, ultimately, caused 
by evidence. The evidence may take the form of explicit falsifications of 
the predictions of the theory or it may be the more vague and general 
result of fishing expeditions. Moreover, the causal sequence by which ev- 
idence leads to theory change may be very complex and indirect. From a 
developmental point of view, this is one of the most important features of 
theory formation, and the central respect in which it differs from such 
alternative developmental explanations as maturation and socialization. 
4. Theories as Representations. So far I have been borrowing the language 
of philosophers of science to describe theories and theory change, and I 
will continue to use that language in describing the children. However, 
ultimately psychologists want to translate that language into the language 
of cognitive science, the theoretical parlance of representations and rules. 
We can think of a theory as a particular kind of system that assigns rep- 
resentations to inputs, in the way that the perceptual system assigns rep- 
resentations to visual input or the syntactic system assigns representations 
to phonological input. The representations that it assigns are, however, 
distinctive in many ways, just as perceptual or syntactic representations 
are distinctive. We can capture these distinctive structural features by talk- 
ing about the specific abstract, coherent, causal, ontologically-committed, 
counterfactual supporting entities and laws of the theory, just as we talk 
about phrase-structures when we describe syntactic representations or 
21/2 d sketches when we describe perceptual representations. The repre- 
sentations are operated on by rules that lead to new representations, the 
499 
ALISON GOPNIK 
theory generates predictions. There are also particular distinctive func- 
tional relations between the theoretical representations and the input to 
them; theories not only predict but also interpret and explain data. 
We know that the input to the perceptual and syntactic systems is pro- 
vided by our sensory systems. Exactly what is the input to the theory 
system? On one view, we might want to propose that there are other rep- 
resentational systems that translate sensory information into some higher 
level of ordinary, primary, atheoretical knowledge. On this view, not all 
our representations would be assigned by theories. Rather an earlier level 
of processing would provide the evidential input to theory formation pro- 
cesses. Some of these systems might correspond to Fodorian modules. 
Alternatively, and more in keeping with the philosophical positions that 
emphasize the "theory-ladeness" of evidence, the system might simply as- 
sign theoretical representations to sensory input, without a separate level 
of evidential representation. 
For example, one might make a particular observation, say I see a par- 
ticular pattern of tracks in a cloud chamber. On any view there will be 
some very low-level atheoretical perceptual processes that will transform 
the raw sensory input into some more abstract representational form, say 
a 21/2 d sketch. On the first view we might want to say, however, that there 
is also a representational system distinct from the theory system which 
further assigns these inputs a particular "ordinary knowledge" represen- 
tation. For example, it might represent them as "blue tracks in a white jar 
on a table." This might then be input to the theory formation system. 
Alternatively, the theory system might itself simply assign the input a par- 
ticular theoretical representation, it might just represent the input as elec- 
trons decaying in a particular way. For various reasons, this strikes me as 
a more attractive option than the first one. However, it is an empirical 
question, and it might differ in different cases. 
On both views the theoretical representation assigned to a particular 
input would then interact in particular rule-governed ways with the other 
representations of the theory. Does it match the predictions of the theory, 
for example? Do some particular pair of theoretical representations co- 
occur in a way that suggests some causal link between them, a link that is 
not specified in the current theory? In this way, the fact that certain rep- 
resentations occurred and not others might lead to changes within the 
theory itself. This could happen even if there were no separate evidential 
level of representation outside the theory itself. 
Most significantly and distinctively, however, on any version of the the- 
ory theory, the very patterns of representation that occur can alter the 
nature of the representational system itself. They can alter the nature of 
the relations between inputs and representations. As we get new inputs, 
and so new representations, the very rules that connect inputs and repre- 
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sentations change. Eventually, we may end up with a system with a com- 
pletely new set of representations and a completely different set of rela- 
tions between inputs and representations than the system we started out 
with. Evidence is causally responsible for theory change, and evidence may 
drive us to construct theories that are radically different from those we 
initially begin with. This differentiates theories from other kinds of rep- 
resentational systems such as modules, and probably differentiates theo- 
retical representations from perceptual and syntactic ones. 
This kind of system may sound so open-ended as to be uninteresting. 
But in fact the theory formation view proposes that the representational 
system will change in relatively orderly, predictable, and constrained ways. 
We can try to capture these features by talking about the dynamic prop- 
erties of theory change. Factors like counterevidence or the explanatory 
drive cause the representational system to change, and do so in particular 
and predictable ways. 
Should we think of this relation betwen inputs and outputs as a kind of 
effective computational procedure? If we know that that the system is in 
state A and receives input B will we be able to tell what the next set of 
representations will be like? The answer at this point is simply that we do 
not know whether there is a procedure like this or not, nor much about 
how it would operate if there were. What we do know, however, is that 
there are consistent causal relations between input and representations, 
both in science and childhood, and my empirical claim is that those rela- 
tions are similar. The best current explanation of how a brain could in- 
stantiate this kind of system of rules and representations is that it is a kind 
of computer. 
There is another, even more profound, question to ask. How does such 
a system get at the truth about the world? I said before, glibly, that it gets 
at the truth about the world because it is designed by evolution to get at 
the truth about the world. But the kind of system I am talking about will 
certainly suffer from the the same problems of underdetermination that 
plague the various proposals that were put forward by philosophers of 
science in the normative tradition. The system will arrive at an answer, 
given data, and different instantiations of the system will (eventually) ar- 
rive at the same answer given the same data. But other answers will still 
be logically possible given the data. 
We might say that the space of relations between the input and output 
will be very much larger than it will be in a modular system, like the visual 
perception system, but still smaller than the space of logical possibilities. 
There will be constraints, though very general constraints, on the kinds of 
relations between inputs and representations that the system will generate. 
The constraints correspond to the general assumptions that underly theory 
formation, that the world has an underlying causal structure, that the 
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structure is most likely to be the simplest one that corresponds to the data, 
and so on. 
The constraints, on my view, largely come from nature via evolution, 
and at some level that fact is responsible for their veridicality. Presumably, 
creatures who constructed representations in different ways in childhood, 
who did not assume underlying causal structure, did not search for the 
simplest explanation, did not falsify hypotheses when there was counter- 
evidence, and so on, were at an evolutionary disadvantage. In that sense 
nature itself guarantees that the system gets to an understanding of nature. 
But, of course, evolution is highly contingent and, for all we know, other 
systems with different sets of constraints might hit on quite different ways 
of constructing veridical representations. Perhaps if quantum mechanical 
effects translated into selection pressures we would have a cognitive system 
that derived representations from inputs in quite different ways, and we 
would be less frustrated in our attempts to understand the quantum uni- 
verse. 
So I would say that the system is veridical because of its evolutionary 
history. However, how the process of evolution, or evolution and culture 
together, actually manages to hit on a system that generates representa- 
tions that match up to the outside world is still profoundly mysterious. 
In any case, however, if are ever to answer these questions, we need first 
to simply do the descriptive work of specifying what the relations between 
inputs and representations are like. There is, at least, nothing mystical or 
incoherent about the idea of a representational system that revises itself 
in this way. Indeed, we have excellent evidence that just such a system 
exists in human minds already. Precisely this sort of system generates the 
representations of science. And we know at least something about how 
that system characteristically proceeds. 
There is an interesting history to this picture of representational change. 
The picture we are presenting here actually has many features in common 
with the picture of science (and of knowledge more generally) that emerged 
in the logical empiricist tradition in the late fifties. The early empiricist 
tradition, the tradition we might call positivism, had attempted to translate 
or define the terms of scientific theories (and other kinds of knowledge) 
into some vocabulary of primitive perceptual terms, "sense-data." The 
project was actually similar in many respects to the projects of much con- 
temporary empiricist theorizing in cognitive science and psychology. By 
the fifties the difficulties of that project had become quite clear. One re- 
action-the reaction that prevailed in "the cognitive revolution," particu- 
larly in the work of Chomsky-was, quite explicitly, to return to the 
apriorist rationalist tradition of Kant and Descartes. 
But within the tradition itself the reaction took a rather different form. 
Carnap's late work and Quine's early work both articulated a view in 
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which the project was not any longer to redefine the theories of science in 
a primitive perceptual vocabulary. Rather one could see the progress of 
science (and knowledge more generally) as the successive articulation and 
replacement of a series of theories (Carnap calls them languages). The first 
in the series of theories is what Carnap calls the thing-language, and what 
we might think of as the language of everyday "folk physics." For Carnap, 
there are systematic relations between the statements of the earlier lan- 
guage and those of the later language, but these relations are much weaker 
than definition. There are many logically possibly alternative languages 
that could be constructed that could still have the appropriate relation to 
the earlier language; one's choice among them will be guided by a number 
of practical scientific considerations (never made entirely clear). One might 
say that Quine translated Carnap's formal account into a memorable pic- 
ture in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", the picture of the web of belief. 
(Pictures speaking louder than logical symbols for most of us, Quine got 
the credit). 
The worm in the apple, the serpent in the garden, of these accounts was 
the idea, which is in both Quine and Carnap, that the choice of the new 
language was "conventional" or "pragmatic." The implication, later made 
quite explicit in Quine, was that the decision was also arbitrary and simply 
socially determined. If Skinner's "Verbal Behavior" informed your view 
of how new languages were constructed, then this arbitrary, convention- 
alist view made sense. This idea set the stage for the later skepticism of 
Quine and the social constructivists who were to follow him. 
The "theory theory" view of the development of knowledge would 
adopt the picture of a succession of theories but would replace convention 
with nature. The choice of which theory to move to, which language to 
make up next, is not simply arbitrary or conventional. Rather it is the 
result of the operation of psychological devices designed by evolution to 
lead to veridical outcomes. Moreover, the initial theory, the first language, 
is not the "thing-language," but can be determined empirically by looking 
at the initial conceptions of infants. 
5. Theories in Childhood. I want to claim that infants and young children 
have cognitive structures that are like those we have just been describing. 
Children's early cognitive structures should have these characteristics if 
they are really theoretical. That is, they should involve appeals to abstract 
theoretical entities, with coherent causal relations among them. Theories 
should lead to characteristic patterns of predictions, including extensions 
to new types of evidence and false predictions, not just to more empirically 
accurate predictions. Theories should also lead to distinctive interpreta- 
tions of evidence, a child with one theory should interpret experiences 
differently than a child with a different theory. Finally, theories should 
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invoke characteristic explanations phrased in terms of these abstract en- 
tities and laws. This distinctive pattern of prediction, interpretation, and 
explanation is among the best indicators of a theoretical structure and the 
best ways of distinguishing the theory theory from such developmental 
competitors as scripts, schemas, and simulations (see Gopnik and Well- 
man 1992). 
The dynamic features I have described should be apparent in children's 
transitions from one theory to a later one. Children should ignore certain 
kinds of counterevidence initially, then account for them by auxiliary hy- 
potheses, then use the new theoretical idea in limited contexts, and only 
finally reorganize their knowledge so that new theoretical entities play a 
central role. During the period when the new theory is, as it were under 
construction, they should engage in extensive experiments relevant to the 
theory, and collect empirical generalizations. Over a given developmental 
period, we should be able to chart the emergence of the new consistent 
theory from the earlier one, and we should be able to predict a period of 
some disorganization in between. Moreover, children should construct 
different theories if they receive different patterns of evidence. These dy- 
namic features of theories also help to distinguish them from other types 
of cognitive structures. In particular, they make theories different from 
modules (see Gopnik and Wellman 1994; Gopnik 1995; Gopnik and Melt- 
zoff 1997). 
If, in fact, we discovered that children's representations and rules were 
like this, we would be licensed in saying that children had theories, and 
that the process of theory construction was similar in scientists and chil- 
dren. 
5.1 An Example-The Child's Changing Theories of the Mind. Well, are 
children's representations and rules like this? Even if the theory theory is 
plausible, is it true? The best argument for any empirical claim is, of 
course, the data. The enthusiasm for the scientific metaphor in psychology 
has stemmed from its real advantages in explaining psychological phe- 
nomena. Two lines of development have been particularly important. 
First, psychologists have looked at our everyday categorizations of ob- 
jects. Earlier theories tried to explain these categorizations in terms of the 
perceptual features of the objects. More recent research suggests that cat- 
egorization is best understood in terms of our everyday theories about the 
underlying causal structure of objects (Murphy and Medin 1985). If we 
look at young children's categorization, both in language and behavior, 
we see a very similar pattern. Even two- and three-year-old children appear 
to categorize objects in terms of "natural kinds," underlying essences with 
causal efficacy. Moreover, their decisions about which objects belong to 
these natural kinds appear to be rooted in naive theories of physics and 
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biology. These very young children have coherent abstract accounts of 
objects and animals and use those accounts to generate predictions and 
explanations (Carey 1985; Keil 1989; Gelman 1986; Gelman and Wellman 
1991). Most significantly, it is possible to chart qualitative conceptual 
changes in children's categorization as their theories are constructed, mod- 
ified, and revised. Thus, in Carey's work, for example, the child catego- 
rization of an object as an "animal" or as "alive" changes profoundly as 
the child's "folk biology" changes (Carey 1985). 
Second, the renewed interest in "folk psychology" has raised the pos- 
sibility, first formulated in the philosophical literature, (Churchland 1984, 
Stich 1983) that our everyday understanding of the mind is analogous to 
a scientific theory. Again, empirical investigations of the child's developing 
understanding of the mind have tended to confirm this view. The majority 
of investigators in the field have argued that the child's early understand- 
ing of the mind can be usefully construed as a theory and that changes in 
that understanding can be thought of as theory changes (Gopnik 1993; 
Gopnik and Wellman 1994; Wellman 1990; Perner 1991, Flavell et al. 
1995, though see Harris 1991 and Leslie 1991 for opposing views). In the 
course of developing an account of the mind children postulate such men- 
tal entities as perceptions, beliefs and desires as a way of explaining or- 
dinary human action. Moreover, there are significant and far-reaching 
conceptual changes in the child's understanding of the mind, much like 
theory changes. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will briefly outline some examples of 
the way that we have used the analogy to science to understand the child's 
developing understanding of the mind. I will not have the space to go into 
all the empirical details or to consider all the possible alternative expla- 
nations, the interested reader can turn to the empirical reports. Instead, I 
will simply give a brief sketch of part of the developmental story. I will 
work backwards from 4-year-olds to newborns, suggesting at each point 
that the child's knowledge is theoretical and differs from earlier knowledge 
in a way that suggests theory change. 
Four-year-old children understand a surprising amount about the na- 
ture of the mind. They make consistent and largely, though not invariably, 
correct predictions about a wide variety of events, including new events 
quite different from events they have previously experienced. We can pres- 
ent these children with a hypothetical event, for example, a story about 
another child who is deceived. This hypothetical child is presented with a 
candy box that is really full of pencils, or a "Hollywood rock" that is 
really made of sponge, or he sees his mother put chocolate in the green 
cupboard and the chocolate is surreptitiously switched to the blue cup- 
board while he is out of the room. Many other stories have also been 
explored. Then we can ask the children to make a wide variety of predic- 
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tions about future events. Where will the other child look? What will he 
think? What will he say? How will he feel? How will the object look to 
him? We can even present these questions as counterfactuals. How would 
he feel if it were otherwise? What would you say if you were him? Four- 
and five-year-olds make all these predictions accurately (Gopnik and 
Astington 1988, Flavell 1986, Perner 1991, Wellman 1990; Wimmer and 
Perner 1983). 
Moreover, these children justify their predictions by offering causal ex- 
planations. The explanations relate the evidence of action to an underlying 
apparatus of beliefs and desires, mental entities and psychological laws, 
and they relate different mental entities to one another in a coherent way. 
Why did he look in the cupboard? He looked in the cupboard because he 
wanted the chocolate and thought it was in the cupboard. How did he 
know it was in the cupboard? He knew it was in the cupboard because 
he saw his mother put it there. The children do this both in prompted 
experimental situations and in their natural spontaneous language 
(Bartsch and Wellman 1989, 1995; Wellman 1990). 
They also interpret action in terms of these underlying psychological 
entities. Presented with a neutral description of human behavior they au- 
tomatically interpret and describe it in terms of beliefs and desires (Lillard 
and Flavell 1990). And they make quite explicit ontological claims about 
mental events. In particular, they make an ontological distinction between 
mental and physical objects (actually they seem to be committed to a kind 
of substance dualism) (Wellman and Estes 1986). So it appears that the 
four-year-old's understanding of the mind has some of the structural and 
functional character of a theory. It postulates abstract entities, beliefs, and 
desires, which are coherently interrelated, with consistent causal relations 
to each other and to the evidence of action. The children make ontological 
commitments and causal attributions. They predict, explain and interpret. 
Does the children's knowledge have the dynamic character of a theory, 
however? In particular, is it constructed from an earlier theory or is it 
discovered through introspection, or does it mature or become internalized 
in social interaction? To answer that we must turn to even younger chil- 
dren, 21/2- and 3-year-olds. Three-year-olds also generate predictions 
about the behavior and mental states of others, they make interpretations 
and provide explanations. But those predictions, interpretations and ex- 
planations are quite different from those of the older children. 
Three- and even 21/2-year-olds make strikingly wide-ranging and accu- 
rate predictions about some mental states, particularly perceptions and 
desires. They predict accurately, for example, that another person on the 
other side of a screen will not be able to see what they see themselves 
(Flavell et al. 1981, Masangkay et al. 1974). They predict that those with 
different desires will perform different actions, and be made happy or sad 
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by different things (Astington and Gopnik 1991; Wooley and Wellman 
1990, Yuill 1984). Even these very young children will also give coherent 
causal explanations of actions in terms of perception and desire. Again 
these predictions are manifested both in experiments and in spontaneous 
speech and behavior (Wooley and Wellman 1990; Bartsch and Wellman 
1989, 1995). 
But when we turn to the young three-year-old's understanding of belief 
we see quite a different pattern. Three-year-olds consistently predict that 
the children in the deceptive cases will act on the reality and not on their 
false belief. They inaccurately but consistently predict that the child will 
think there are pencils in the box or that the chocolate is in the green 
cupboard, or that the rock is a sponge. They make similarly inaccurate 
predictions about emotions and actions, the child will look for the choc- 
olate in the right cupboard. She will not be disappointed when she sees 
the pencils (Gopnik and Astington 1988, Perner 1991, Wellman 1990, 
Wimmer and Perner 1983). 
More strikingly, their explanations, both in spontaneous speech and in 
experimental situations are consistent with these predictions. For example, 
they give an inadequate causal account of the sources of beliefs, they are 
unable to discriminate, between what can be learned by seeing something 
and what can be learned by drawing an inference about it (Gopnik and 
Graf 1988; O'Neill, Astington, and Flavell 1992). This kind of rich causal 
account of the source of beliefs is necessary to support correct predictions 
about false beliefs. Two-year-olds explain actions in terms of desires and, 
as the third year progresses, in terms of true beliefs, but not in terms of 
false beliefs (Bartsch and Wellman 1995). Most strikingly of all, they mis- 
interpret and misreport the very data that falsify their predictions, and 
confirm the four-year-old's theory. Suppose we present them with a child 
actually opening the deceptive box and manifesting surprise (Moses and 
Flavell 1990). Or even better suppose we actually let them experience the 
deception themselves (Gopnik and Astington 1988, Gopnik 1993). Young 
three-year-olds in these circumstances simply misinterpret the data. They 
insist, in spite of the data, that both the other and they themselves always 
knew, and always acted on, the truth (notice that their inaccuracy in their 
own case rules out the possibility that they learn about the mind through 
some sort of privileged first-person introspective knowledge; see Gopnik 
1993). 
These phenomena have suggested to a number of investigators in the 
field that the difference between the three- and four-year-olds is best char- 
acterized as a difference in the implicit theories of the world that the chil- 
dren hold, though there is some debate about exactly how to characterize 
that theoretical difference. Broadly, 21/2- and young three-year-olds seem 
to understand the mind largely in terms of desires and perceptions, and 
507 
ALISON GOPNIK 
they think perception is always veridical. As long as you are, as it were, 
perceptually pointed at the right part of the world you will know every- 
thing there is to know about it. They make incorrect predictions or expla- 
nations in cases where the causal relation between the mind and world is 
more complex, such as cases of false belief. 
The differences between three- and four-year-olds are now well-estab- 
lished though there are, of course, debates about the best way to explain 
them. More recently, there are starting to be some hints about the tran- 
sition from the earlier view to the later one. Older three-year-olds often 
show an interesting transitional pattern, in which they will occasionally 
make the correct predictions about the belief in limited circumstances. One 
relevant circumstance seem to be when they are forced to confront and 
explain counterevidence to the theory (Mitchell and LaCohee 1991, Well- 
man and Bartsch 1988). Another is when the belief problems are placed 
in the context of the child's well-established understanding of desire or 
perception (Gopnik and Slaughter 1991, Gopnik et al. 1994, Flavell and 
Moses, 1994, Moses 1993). These children seem to show the first glimmers 
of the new theory of belief when it must be recruited in special circum- 
stances to explain counterevidence. It initially functions as a kind of aux- 
iliary hypothesis. And they also seem to show the first glimmers of the 
new theory when the analogies between problems of belief and problems 
of desire and perception are made particularly clear and salient. Initially, 
however, they only use the idea of belief in general, and false belief, in 
particular, in these limited contexts. They fail to apply them widely in an 
explanatory and predictive way. 
Moreover, three-year-old children show some signs of intense experi- 
ment and observation during this transition. They become fascinated by 
cases of deception or misleading appearance, or of differences in their own 
mental states and those of others, and they explore the nature of those 
differences (Bartsch and Wellman 1995). 
There are also even more interesting but even more tentative hints 
emerging in the literature that the transition from one theory to another 
is actually caused by the accumulation of evidence and counterevidence. 
The first hint is that children with many siblings consistently make the 
theory change earlier than children with fewer siblings. (This is in spite of 
the fact that children with fewer siblings do better on measures of general 
cognitive achievement like IQ; see Perner and Ruffman 1992.) The most 
common explanation that has been proposed for this finding is that sib- 
lings provide a particularly rich source of evidence about the diversity of 
beliefs and desires. Similarly, children appear to make the theory change 
sooner if their families consistently discuss mental states at the dinner 
table, another important source of evidence (Dunn et al. 1991). 
Most concretely and convincingly, we can actually reliably induce the 
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theory change in 31/2-year-olds. Slaughter did this by providing the chil- 
dren with relevant counter evidence over a two-week period in a training 
study. Interestingly, evidence about perception and desire, as well as belief 
was effective in improving the child's understanding of belief. Moreover, 
children who received salient counterevidence also showed improved un- 
derstanding of other parts of the theory that are coherently linked to an 
understanding of belief, such as an understanding of the sources of infor- 
mation (Gopnik et al. 1994, Slaughter and Gopnik in press). 
These sorts of investigations of the dynamic aspects of theories in de- 
velopmental psychology may ultimately have the most to contribute to 
our understanding of science. Theory change proceeds more uniformly 
and quickly in children than in scientists, and so is considerably easier to 
observe, and we can even experimentally determine what kinds of evidence 
lead to change. In children, we may actually be able to see "the logic of 
discovery" in action. 
Can we trace the theory formation process back even further? The lower 
limit for purely linguistic tasks like the ones we have described so far is 
about 21/2-years-old. With some ingenuity, however, we can use other 
kinds of paradigms to explore even younger children's predictions about 
the mind. We mentioned that by 36 months or so children show a secure 
understanding of the diversity of perceptions and desires. Some recent 
work in our laboratory suggests that even this understanding is con- 
structed by revising an earlier incorrect theory. We devised a task to ex- 
plore 24- and 30-month-old's predictions about perception. The youngest 
children consistently made incorrect predictions, when they were in- 
structed to hide the object from the experimenter they responded by plac- 
ing the object on the experimenter's side of the screen, so that it was 
invisible to them and visible to the experimenter. In contrast, most of the 
36-month-olds made the correct predictions both behaviorally and ver- 
bally. Most interestingly, the 24- and 30-month-olds engaged in extensive 
experimental behaviors in these settings. They moved objects from one 
side of the screen to the other and frequently got up themselves and moved 
to the other side of the table to examine the result (Gopnik et al. 1994; 
see also Lempers et al. 1977) 
Repacoli designed a similar experiment examining the origins of an un- 
derstanding of the diversity of desire. The experimenter tasted goldfish 
crackers and made a disgusted face and tasted raw broccoli and made a 
delighted face. She then held out her hand to the child and said "give me 
some." 18-month-olds correctly inferred her desire: they gave her broccoli. 
In contrast, 14-month-olds made a relevantly incorrect prediction: they 
gave her goldfish crackers. Just as in the case of understanding perception, 
the incorrect predictions of the earlier theory set the stage for the advances 
of the later theory (Repacoli and Gopnik 1995). 
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Also, as in that case, there is some evidence of experimental behavior 
at this point. One interpretation of the apparently irrational behavior of 
the "terrible twos" is that it represents a series of experiments exploring 
the divergences between the child's desires and those of others. (Indeed it 
is the very cold-bloodedness with which a toddler slowly reaches for the 
object you have expressly forbidden, carefully examining your face all the 
time, that makes these behaviors so infuriating. If the child is a psychol- 
ogist, then we parents are the laboratory rats). 
Of course, as we deal with younger and younger children, it becomes 
more difficult to demonstrate that their understanding is genuinely theo- 
retical. We have evidence of consistent patterns of prediction and inter- 
pretation, and of experimentation, but not of explicit explanation and 
ontological commitment. Ideally we would want to show that these pre- 
dictions are consistent, wide-ranging and productive, and that these ex- 
periments are systematic and are related to the cognitive changes. More- 
over, we would want to show that new evidence is causally responsible for 
the changes in predictions and interpretations. (We have a bit more sub- 
stantial evidence along these lines for other theoretical changes in infancy, 
particularly changes in infants' understanding of objects; see Gopnik 1988, 
Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997.) It is striking, however, that the child's knowl- 
edge at each stage seems conceptually related to knowledge at the suc- 
ceeding stage. An incorrect view of perception leads to incorrect predic- 
tions about action; this is replaced by a better view of perception that 
leads to incorrect predictions about false beliefs, and so on. 
At this point some of the psychologists, scientists and philosophers who 
were crying out at the start of this paper, may well be doing so again; 
"Surely, you cannot think it is theories all the way down!" Well, yes, 
actually, I do think it is theories all the way down. Andrew Meltzoff and 
I have argued that, at birth, infants already draw some inferences about 
human behavior that go well beyond the direct evidence of their senses 
(Gopnik and Meltzoff 1994, 1997, Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993). In partic- 
ular, young infants already seem to make rather abstract mappings be- 
tween the bodily movements of other people and their own internal states 
and to draw at least a primitive kind of inference and prediction on this 
basis. These inferences are apparent in infants' early imitation of facial 
gestures and in their more complex interactions with other people. Infants 
seem to have innate knowledge of the mind, and this knowledge is theory- 
like, at least in the sense that it goes well beyond immediate perceptual 
experience, that it enables genuine and productive predictions, and that it 
is revised in the light of further evidence. (When we say that this knowledge 
is innate we do not mean this in the philosophical sense, which is that 
neither the philosopher in question nor any of the guys down the hall 
could think of a way to learn it. We mean that it has been demonstrated 
in 42-minute-old infants (Meltzoff and Moore 1983).) 
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Notice that this innate theory gives human beings a tremendous boost 
in solving the apparently intractable problem of inferring the minds of 
others. It is possible that the severe difficulties of people with autism, for 
example, stem from the absence of this initial rich mapping from the self 
to other people (Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993). At the same time, however, 
the initial theory sets us up for exactly the problems that later theory 
formation processes must solve. We innately assume that our mental states 
are the same as those of others and only an extended process of evidence 
gathering, experimentation, and theoretical revision allows us to give a 
proper explanation of the many cases in which they are not. 
6. Conclusion. At this point, the analogy between science and development 
has been of most benefit to developmental psychologists. In the particular 
case of the child's understanding of the mind, it has also been illuminating 
to philosophers of mind. Apparently philosophical questions about the 
nature of our adult knowledge of the mind can be answered by develop- 
mental evidence. For example, a theory view and an introspectivist or 
simulation view of adult knowledge lead to quite different predictions 
about development, predictions that can be empirically tested (see essays 
in Davies and Stone 1995). 
If the analogy is correct, however, it should be important and interesting 
to philosophers of science as well. In particular, any account of science 
will, at the least, need to be able to explain the apparently striking simi- 
larities between the two domains. Accounts that stress the sociology of 
science, for example, will have to explain why children's cognitive pro- 
cesses are apparently so similar to scientists' when their sociology is quite 
different. More positively, the analogy suggests a naturalistic answer to 
one of the most puzzling and important questions about science: why it is 
that we human beings should be able to discover such peculiar things 
about the universe we live in. So far the details of the developmental an- 
swer to that question have largely been borrowed from classical accounts 
of scientific change. But we might hope that the borrowing will eventually 
go in both directions, that, for example, studying the transitional processes 
in the three- to four-year-old's theory of mind might illuminate historical 
processes of theory change in science. Finally, the analogy also might 
contribute to normative investigations of science. Some philosophers 
might say that they do not want to know how mere contingent human 
brains happen to learn about the world, but rather how it is that any device 
could possibly learn about the world. But, if we are serious about that 
project, we should also want to know how evolution actually did construct 
the device that is the best learner on Earth: the human child. 
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